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Abstract
The (German) market for law professors fulfils the conditions for a hog cycle: In the short
run, supply cannot be extended or limited; future law professors must be hired soon after
they first present themselves, or leave the market; demand is inelastic. Using a comprehen-
sive German dataset, we show that the number of market entries today is negatively corre-
lated with the number of market entries eight years ago. This suggests short-sighted
behavior of young scholars at the time when they decide to prepare for the market. Using
our statistical model, we make out-of-sample predictions for the German academic market
in law until 2020.
Introduction
What do pigs and law professors have in common? They come in cycles! German academics
who observe historical fluctuations on the market for law professors are occasionally overheard
mumbling, tongue in cheek: It’s a hog cycle. In this paper we read this sigh as a testable proposi-
tion. We show that the German market for law professors fulfils the theoretical conditions for
the emergence of a hog cycle, and test empirically whether academics allow themselves to be
governed by the brute logic of supply and demand, or whether their job market behavior is mit-
igated by additional forces that are not part of the neoclassical model. This endeavor contrib-
utes to a growing literature which addresses the fact that even today we still “know surprisingly
little about the market for law professors” [1]:4.
On pigs. . .
As its name suggests, the concept of “hog cycles” hails from agricultural economics. It describes
the idea that once farmers observe a high pork price, they tend to start breeding pigs all at the
same time, which means that one year later (when pigs are ready for slaughter) the market will
be swamped with pork. Since pork now exceeds demand, its price drops, thus incentivizing
farmers to reduce (or cease) their breeding activity, which in turn produces a swing in the
opposite direction: A year later, too few pigs are available for slaughter, so demand exceeds sup-
ply, prices explode and the cycle restarts. Fig 1 illustrates this principle with the example from
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early 20th century Berlin (Germany) which ignited academic research on this issue. As one
sees, apart from a positive time trend (in the long run, Germans spent more money on buying
pork), pork prices were fluctuating cyclically, resulting from cycles of over- and undersupply.
Theoreticians call the underlying logic a cobweb [3, 4]. Three conditions must be fulfilled
for a cycle to emerge: (1) in the short run production cannot react to changes in demand; (2)
the product in question is perishable; (3) demand in the short run does not increase if there is
more supply [3]. Pigs meet all three conditions: (1) Newborn piglets need time to mature; (2)
there is the optimal moment for slaughter; (3) if pork is cheap, people hardly eat more. Assume
the demand for pork drops unexpectedly, say since consumers dread swine flu. Farmers have
to lower prices if they want to sell any pork. Since this meant that profit was low, this year they
breed fewer pigs. If these pigs are ready for slaughter, supply is small and prices are high. Farm-
ers react by breeding a larger next generation. When that reaches the market, supply is in
excess of demand. What originally was an exogenous shock has triggered a cycle. This holds
whenever supply and demand react symmetrically, i.e., the elasticity of demand is similar to
the elasticity of supply. If supply is more elastic than demand, the cycle turns into a self-rein-
forcing spiral. If demand is more elastic than supply, the cycle eventually vanishes [3]. Of
course, there is no cycle to start with if a sufficiently large fraction of farmers anticipate this
and adapt their breeding policy [5, 6].
Fig 1. Hog Cycle That Started the Literature ([2]: 10). English translation of German original: Hog Prices in Berlin July 1896 to June 1914 (Pigs with Live
Weight 80–100 kg) in Mark [German currency of the time] per 100 kg live weight.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159815.g001
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These mechanisms are now well understood, thanks to a wealth of academic research. The
first papers date back almost a century [2, 7] and were immediately translated into practical
advice for farmers, urging them to adopt an anti-cyclical investment policy [8]. Later, Nobel
winners Ronald Coase [9, 10] and Paul Samuelson [11] have contributed to this literature, as
well as a long list of agricultural economists [12–19]. Similar phenomena have been docu-
mented on the market for potatoes [3, 20], for real estate [21, 22], for oil [23], and for nurses
[24]. So how about bright young academics?
. . . and professors
Given how “little is empirically known about what explains success in the market for law pro-
fessors” [1]:1, professors-to-be have to take decisions in a complex market based on very few
observables. The most salient such observable is the number of positions available when the
candidate considers embarking on her academic career. If there are presently more open posi-
tions than professors on the market, post-docs may be tempted to start a career in academia.
Years later, however, they may find that many others had the same intuition, thereby creating
an oversupply which in turn discourages junior researchers and will soon lead to law schools
having problems to fill their vacancies. If this were true, we would observe a hog cycle. Of
course, future law professors are not hogs, tenure is not slaughter, and hiring a new assistant
professor is not breeding. But in theory, the market for law professors fulfils the three condi-
tions, outlined above, which the emergence of a cycle requires.
Note a difference between the proverbial market for hogs, and the market for law professors,
though. If there is excess supply, the price of meat may be reduced. If there is excess demand,
the price of meat may increase. This channel for short-term adjustment is shut off in the Ger-
man market for law professors. Prices, i.e. salaries, are defined by statute, and do not react to
market fluctuations. In the meat market, the inefficiency results from a mismatch between
investment (in rearing piglets) and prices. In the market for professors, the inefficiency results
from a mismatch between investment (in habilitation) and the probability of being hired as a
professor. Yet as we explain in the following paragraphs, the conditions for a cobweb are no
less fulfilled.
(1) Becoming a law professor takes time. In the German system, scholars are eligible only if
they have earned their doctor juris (Dr. iur., roughly J.S.D. equivalent, not just a J.D.) and have
subsequently passed “habilitation” (from Latin habilitare, to qualify, [25]). Habilitation is a for-
mal procedure by which the entire professorate of the law school testifies that a candidate is
competent to teach law. It requires writing a second book (traditionally called Habilitationss-
chrift, habilitation thesis), having a decent list of publications, and convincing the entire law
school during a talk and discussion. Legally, candidates may pass habilitation without having
held a post-doc position. The candidate could just submit her thesis, plus her list of publica-
tions, to her law school of choice and ask to be habilitated. Yet this legal option is almost never
used. One reason is financial: Outside university, there are practically no jobs or stipends for
future law professors. The other, more important reason concerns habilitation itself: Getting
the whole law school to approve the candidate is a political exercise. The candidate needs
strong backing by her supervisor. Effectively, law schools see this as an occasion to express
approval or disapproval with the supervisor’s own scholarly work. The candidate is regarded as
the supervisor’s pupil, and support for the supervisor’s academic program is at stake. If law
schools do not receive this signal of credibility, odds for success are very low. This implies that,
when she accepts a candidate as a post-doc, the supervisor engages her own academic reputa-
tion. Consequently, preparing for the academic market is practically a joint decision by the
supervisor and the candidate.
The Hog Cycle of Law Professors
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This explains why the standard career path follows the apprentice system. Some esteemed
law professor hires the future colleague as a post-doc (Habilitand). Once the post-doc has been
hired, it is rare that she leaves academia before finishing habilitation. (There are no statistics on
the drop out rate, but our own experience and hearsay suggest that it is negligible). Having
spent additional time at the university would not give her an advantage on the market for non-
academic lawyers. On the contrary, she would be perceived as less inclined to do practical
work, if not poorly equipped for the challenges of legal practice. Holding a post-doc position is
thus perceived as a negative signal by the market for non-academic lawyers. Most post-docs
would also regard it as personal failure if they did not pass habilitation; they stick to their habil-
itation plans not least for reasons of self-esteem. The typical post-doc position is for the dura-
tion of six years, but finishing the thesis often takes a bit longer (and post-docs and their
supervisors creatively need to find her a living for that extra period). According to statistical
data reported by Germany’s Federal Bureau of Statistics, the time passed between earning the
doctoral degree and passing habilitation was 7.76 years on average over all years for which data
is available (1960 to 1989). There is thus a time lag of about eight years between the decision to
prepare a new scholar for the market and the moment when she can apply for a position. The
short run supply of law professors is inelastic.
(2) By passing habilitation, a young scholar becomes a Privatdozent, i.e., an academic enti-
tled to teach, but not usually on a salaried position. Since the law school that granted habilita-
tion is legally prohibited from hiring this candidate itself, the candidate must go on the market
and hope to be hired by a different law school. Most Privatdozenten are on the market for a
year or two. If they have not found a position within three or four years, odds are low that they
ever will. The law schools take the fact that a Privatdozent has not been hired by other law
schools as a signal that something must be wrong with this candidate. Once a Privatdozent has
taken up a position in legal practice, returning to academia is close to impossible. This makes
future law professors a perishable commodity. Note that future law professors also have very
little room for changing the moment when they enter the market, in anticipation of changing
market conditions. Speeding up the writing process is a frequent plan, but it hardly ever suc-
ceeds. Postponing habilitation is usually not possible either, since positions expire.
(3) To date there are only two private law schools in Germany (BLS in Hamburg, EBS in
Wiesbaden). The remaining 42 law schools [26] and other departments that occasionally hire
lawyers (e.g., business or technology) are funded by the state. This helped law schools during
the financial crisis, as their budgets were basically unaffected. Yet it also means that law schools
cannot react to an oversupply of excellent candidates by creating new positions. Moreover, pro-
fessors are public servants, with salaries fixed by statute. Therefore law schools cannot react to
excess supply by lowering prices either. Sadly, if there are more good candidates than the mar-
ket can take, the market does not clear. Those who have not been hired must change their pro-
fession. Most of them join law firms. The third condition for a cycle is thus also fulfilled:
Demand is not elastic enough to parry fluctuations of supply.
Given that these theoretical conditions are fulfilled, one spark might have been enough to
ignite the cycle. In the past, the German market for law professors was hit by exogenous shocks
on multiple occasions. The two most prominent shocks happened to be positive ones. In the
1960s and early 70s, the German government decided to invest heavily in university education.
No less than 15 new law schools were founded in Augsburg, Bayreuth, Bielefeld, Bochum, Bre-
men, Düsseldorf, Gießen, Hagen, Hamburg II, Hannover, Konstanz, Mannheim, Osnabrück,
Passau and Regensburg. Many additional law professors were needed to fill these new posi-
tions. The next shock came with reunification. The former German Democratic Republic had
five law schools (Berlin, Halle, Jena, Leipzig and Potsdam), and four more were established
shortly after reunification (Dresden, Frankfurt/Oder, Greifswald and Rostock). Since most East
The Hog Cycle of Law Professors
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German law professors were believed to be too close to the Communist regime, most of them
soon lost their positions. They were replaced with candidates from the West. In both periods,
demand heavily exceeded supply. In theory, either shock would have been sufficient to start a
hog cycle.
In 2002, the position of a “junior professor” was introduced to the German academic system
to supplant traditional “habilitation” procedures. Law schools, however, were reluctant to offer
such positions: Their number increased from 1 when first introduced to merely 20 at the end
of our sample (German Federal Bureau of Statistics schedule H201.250), meaning that no more
than 25 lawyers had ever held a junior professor position within our sampling window. Even
five years later, in 2014, there were less than 40 positions in total, and virtually none was
reported to come with a tenure track option [27]. Passing habilitation remains the only de facto
possibility to enter the market for professors. Once a scholar has passed habilitation, she is no
longer eligible for junior professorship, so these positions cannot absorb excess supply either.
Hypothesis
Given the theoretical considerations outlined above, we have reason to expect the occurrence of
a cycle in the German job market for legal academics, with a duration between six and nine
years (eight years being the typical time needed until habilitation). This leads to our hypothesis:
The supply of German law professors exhibits negative autocorrelation with a lag between
six and nine years.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to put this hypothesis forward, let alone test it.
There is one predecessor paper on the German market for law professors, covering the period
from 1949 to 1969 [28], but it only reports aggregate descriptive statistics; a more recent empir-
ical study of the US job market for law professors [1] did not gather time series data.
In the remainder of the paper, we describe our data (2.) and explore our hog cycle hypothe-
sis by testing for negative autocorrelation and adding control variables (3.). Finally, we discuss
the robustness of our model using additional specifications (4.) and conclude by using our
empirical model to predict the supply of law professors for another ten years (5.).
Materials and Methods
We want to explain the number of habilitations in a given year with the number of habilitations
six to nine years prior. We thus need a time series, which we generate from data about individ-
ual habilitations.
Ideally we would like to know, for each candidate who has passed habilitation, her name (to
double-check with alternative sources), the sub-discipline (private, public, or criminal law),
and, most importantly, the year when the candidate passed habilitation. We can get these infor-
mation from two partly overlapping sources:
A statute from 1969 (see Federal Law Gazette BGBl. vol. I, pp. 265) created the German
National Library and obliges all publishing houses to submit at least one copy of each newly
published book to that library. Based on these submissions, the “German National Bibliogra-
phy” has subsequently been compiled and published. If the book in question is a habilitation
thesis, this is noted in the bibliography, together with the year of the habilitation procedure. To
the extent possible, the statute on the German National Library was applied retroactively. Data
for habilitations seem reasonably reliable from 1960 onwards.
Unfortunately, sampling revealed that this data is partly incomplete. To complete the data,
we exploit the fact that a Who’s Who of German academics, the Kürschners Gelehrtenkalender,
was recently made available electronically (www.degruyter.com/view/db/kdgo). In this digest,
professors of all disciplines at universities of German language self-report biographical
The Hog Cycle of Law Professors
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sketches. Since its web interface allowed merely the exporting of names, not the year of habili-
tation, the sub-discipline and the university, we had to complete these data points by hand.
Hand coding was also necessary to identify persons who had been invited to contribute to the
digest without having passed habilitation. This mainly concerns honorary professors, i.e., prac-
titioners who receive the honorary title of a professor in exchange for teaching students free of
charge. We have removed such entries from our dataset.
We have matched these two datasets by name and removed all duplicates. The resulting
gross dataset contains 2071 data points. We thus have complete data of 2071 habilitations for
the time between 1876 and 2009. (Data from 2010 onwards is still too incomplete to include.)
However, we truncate our dataset in 1960, before which year we cannot rely on the records to
be complete. This leaves us with 1993 data points, which are available (with control variables
included) as S1 File. There is a predecessor publication reporting descriptive statistics of habili-
tations in law fromWorld War II until 1969 [28]. It relies on a survey, but unfortunately
reports only aggregates. We therefore cannot use this publication to extend our time series fur-
ther into the past.
In our regressions, we work with the total number of habilitations per year. Our original
dataset comprises 50 observations. Depending on the length of the lag, it is reduced to the
number of years for which we can observe the lag. Given the inevitably small number of obser-
vations, it is all the more remarkable that we find very robust results.
Finally, to identify sub-disciplines, we have double-checked our data with lists compiled by
the associations of private-law professors (website of Zivilrechtslehrervereinigung, www.zlv-
info.de, accessed on 1 Oct 2010), of criminal-law professors (courtesy of Prof. Bernd Schüne-
mann in private correspondence on 20 Jan 2011), and of public-law professors (website of Ver-
einigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, http://vdstrl.zar-muenster.de, accessed on 1 Oct
2010).
Fig 2 shows that the production of law professors has not been smooth. There was a first
spike in the early 70s and a second shortly after the year 2000. In the intermediate period, and
possibly also in the current years, there is a much smaller supply of law professors. Note that
visual inspection of the raw data already suggests a similarity with the hog cycle graph in Fig 1.
Fig 3 demonstrates that the development in the sub-disciplines was very similar. The only
remarkable difference concerns the early spike (which was more pronounced in private law)
and the recent spike (which was more pronounced in public law). Furthermore, habilitation
data in criminal law is noisier, which may be attributed to the comparatively small number of
law professors organized in this association. The overall shape of the curve is nonetheless simi-
lar. Since sub-disciplines do not make a pronounced difference, in the remainder of the paper
we work with the complete dataset.
Results
Autocorrelation
If there is a hog cycle of law professors, the supply of professors today must be negatively corre-
lated with the supply of professors x years ago. As a first test for our hypothesis, we estimate
time series regressions with an autocorrelation term. Specifically we estimate
yt ¼ aþ rytx þ εt ð1Þ
where yt is the number of habilitations in year t, α is a constant term, yt-x is the number of
habilitations x years ago, and εt is residual error. The coefﬁcient of interest is ρ, which we
expect to be negative and signiﬁcant. The peaks in Fig 2 suggest that the data might be hetero-
skedastic, which is why we estimate Huber-White robust standard errors.
The Hog Cycle of Law Professors
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Autocorrelation requires the coefficient for the number of habilitations x years ago to be sig-
nificantly different from zero. Fig 4 compresses the findings from 17 time series regressions
with different lags. It illustrates two findings: First, all coefficients for lags between length 8 and
21 are negative, i.e., below the zero line. We thus do find a hog cycle. If there have been many
Fig 3. Development in the Three Institutionalised Sub-disciplines. Total number of habilitations per year.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159815.g003
Fig 2. Production of Law Professors. Total number of habilitations per year.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159815.g002
The Hog Cycle of Law Professors
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habilitations in the past, the statistical model predicts few habilitations today, and vice versa.
This is what we expected. However, the error bars indicate that only lags from nine to 16 years
are significantly different from zero.
For the lag at the upper end of our expectation, i.e., a lag of nine years, the autocorrelation is
weakly significant (p = .051), see Table 1. This model predicts that there are 52.82 new law pro-
fessors on the market every year, minus .258 times the number of habilitations nine years ago.
Since this number has never been zero, the predicted number of habilitations is always smaller
than 52.82 –but the more so, the larger the supply in the past. The negative correlation is pro-
nounced. Four habilitations in the past seem to deter one habilitation now.
Fig 4. Autocorrelation (absent controls). Dots are coefficients of the lag of the number of habilitations x years
ago from regression (1), bars represent the standard error of this regressor.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159815.g004
Table 1. Pure Autocorrelation.
lag9 habil -.258+
cons 52.816***
N 41
p model .051
R2 .0585
depvar: # habilitations in year x, robust standard errors
*** p < .001,
** p < .01,
* p < .05,
+ p < .1
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159815.t001
The Hog Cycle of Law Professors
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Our data thus support the theoretical prediction of negative autocorrelation, for a lag at the
upper end of our expectation. Yet deeper lags are also significant, and there are also statistical
reasons to revisit the estimation. Even the best-performing model with one lag explains only
13% of the variance. Obviously a lot of the fluctuation in the supply of law professors is still
unexplained. More importantly even, as long as we miss those additional factors that determine
the development of habilitations over time, the coefficients of that time lag(s) in Table 1 risk
being inconsistent due to omitted variable bias. In the next section, we introduce control vari-
ables to mitigate this bias.
Control Variables
Fig 5 shows that, despite the fluctuations, the number of habilitations grows over time. (The
red line graphs the predicted number of habilitations if we regress the output of law faculties
only on the respective year.) Over the 50 years of observation, legal academia has been
growing.
The German apprenticeship model of academic careers takes considerable time. Data by the
German Federal Bureau of Statistics (schedule 4.15.2a) show that between 1980 and 2008, the
mean age at habilitation was 39.76 (standard deviation .92), so future law professors are around
the age of 40 upon entering the market. One should expect that there are more candidates the
larger the respective birth cohort is. The number of those who bring the right talents should be
more or less proportional to the number of those born forty years before. Consider Fig 6,
which depicts data on birth cohorts from the German Federal Bureau of Statistics.
Fig 6 illustrates why birth cohorts are relevant for understanding the production of law pro-
fessors. The data contain several structural breaks: one drop in birth cohorts, presumably caused
by the economic crisis in the early 30s (playing itself out in the early 70s), and an even more pro-
nounced dip, which resulted from the end ofWorldWar II (and played itself out in the mid-
1980s). Conversely, steep increases resulted from the baby booms in the early Nazi years (becom-
ing effective in the late 70s) and during the recovery after World War II (peaking in the early
2000s). Overall, there is the clear negative trend characteristic of modern affluent societies.
Fig 5. Time Trend.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159815.g005
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The right panel of Fig 6 is even more important. It shows that birth numbers also exhibit
autocorrelation. The autocorrelation is negative in the short run, and most pronounced around
eleven years, and positive in the long run, with a peak at 27 years. Now the original time series
regressions from Fig 4 cannot discriminate between the two channels of negative autocorrela-
tion: the one resulting from parents’ decisions on family planning, and the other resulting from
the future candidate’s decisions on her own career. Controlling for the size of birth cohorts will
isolate the latter effect.
The supply of professors need not be proportional to the size of the birth cohort. It would
only be proportional if the composition of professions in the population were stable over time.
Now, in the period of observation, Germany has experienced what is often referred to as the
“education revolution”. While at the beginning of our time series only little more than 5% of a
cohort passed high-school exams (Abitur) and were therefore eligible for university education,
this number grew steadily and has reached almost 25% today [29]. If the supply of professors is
proportional to those members of a birth cohort who go to university, rather than to the total
size of the cohort, we still have an omitted variable.
We therefore use the size of the student cohort of which the future law professor is part as
an additional control variable. Specifically, we use the number of students who were enrolled in
German universities 20 years ago. We take this data from the German Federal Bureau of Statis-
tics. The lag of 20 years is motivated by the fact that a typical law professor is around 40 when
she is on the market, and that Germans typically enter university around age 20.
If we add the time trend, the birth cohort 40 years ago, and the student cohort 20 years ago
to the specification of (1), only shorter lags of the number of habilitations turn out significant.
The best performing model now has a highly plausible lag of eight years (Fig 7).
The regressions in Table 2 show that, once we control for the size of the student cohort, the
effect of the birth cohort becomes immaterial. In model 2, the regressor of the birth cohort is
insignificant. Adding this control variable does not explain any additional variance. Two more
findings are remarkable. With these regressions, we explain a huge proportion of the variance,
namely more than 75%. Moreover, once we control for the size of the student cohort, the over-
all time trend becomes negative. Student cohorts grow faster than calendar time.
Fig 6. Development of Birth Cohorts over Time.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159815.g006
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Actually we can even be more sophisticated. In model 3 of Table 2, we regress student
cohorts 20 years ago on birth cohorts 40 years ago and the time trend. Both coefficients are sig-
nificant, and have the expected signs: student cohorts grow over time, and they grow faster
than birth cohorts (which is why, even when controlling for birth cohorts, the time trend
remains significant and negative). In the last step, using the procedure introduced by [30], we
Fig 7. Adding Time Trend, Birth Cohort and Student Cohort. Dots are the coefficients of the lag of the number
of habilitations x years ago, bars represent the standard error of this regressor.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159815.g007
Table 2. Adding Time Trend and Student Cohort.
model 1 model 2 model 3
depvar # habil # habil student cohort
time trend -2.772*** -2.366*** 2.210***
student cohort lag20 1.659*** 1.522***
birth cohort lag40 .011 .021***
lag8 habil -.335*** -.405**
cons 68.087*** 53.138** -44.277***
N 42 42 42
p model < .001 < .001 < .001
R2 .7738 .7808 .9353
depvar models 1 and 2: # habilitations in year x, robust standard errors; depvar model 3: student cohort, 20 years ago; time trend is 0 in 1960, and grows by 1
every year; student cohort is # of newly inscribed students in all German universities, 20 years ago; birth cohort is # of births (in 1,000), 40 years ago
*** p < .001,
** p < .01,
* p < .05
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159815.t002
The Hog Cycle of Law Professors
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can test whether birth cohorts have a significant indirect effect on the number of habilitations,
mediated by student cohorts (for background see [31]). This turns out to be the case (z of indi-
rect effect 3.867, p = .00011). Thus birth cohorts matter chiefly because they affect how many
students go to university, which in turn affects how many graduates can become professors.
Alternative Career Options
Arguably, when they consider preparing themselves for a career in academia, promising young
lawyers consider attractive alternative career options. Recall that, once they have become a
post-doc, it is very unusual for lawyers to leave university and go to practice (unless forced to
do so since, post-habilitation, they cannot find a job at a university). Therefore the relevant
moment for exploring alternative career paths is after having earned their Dr. juris, and before
taking up a post-doc position.
In the German system, future law professors typically consider one of two alternative career
paths. Those who are interested in earning money would join one of the big law firms. Those
more interested in advancing justice, serving their country, or maybe having a couple of chil-
dren soon (note that the system of maternity leave is most generous for public servants), would
rather join the judiciary. In Germany, lawyers may become judges right after having finished
their legal education. After the age of 32, the judiciary normally no longer hires, meaning that
lawyers stand little chance of becoming judges should they pass habilitation, but are not hired
by a law school. All over the country, there are more than 20,000 judges. Careers in the judi-
ciary tend to be slow, but can ultimately lead to the Supreme Court or to one of the prestigious
appellate courts. Salaries are rather modest and fixed by statute. Given that we have already
seen that a lag of eight years is most relevant, we also check for career opportunities eight years
before a generation of candidates is on the market.
Fig 8. Number of Judges in Germany (in 1,000).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159815.g008
The Hog Cycle of Law Professors
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Entry into the judiciary critically depends on hiring. As Fig 8 shows, until the mid-90s, the
number of judges grew slowly, with the only peak resulting from reunification. We take this
data from the biennial employment reports of the German Federal Ministry of Justice.
As a proxy for earning prospects in the big law firms, we take the development of gross
national product; unfortunately, no major law firm has been both willing and able to give us
time series data on salaries for associates, or on the number of associates hired per year. As Fig
9 shows, GNP has been growing almost linearly year by year. The turnover of law firms should
be positively correlated with the ability of potential clients to pay higher fees, which in turn
should be correlated with GNP.
The regressions in Table 3 make it clear that alternative career options are not an important
determinant in the decision to prepare for an academic career in law. If we do not control for
the size of the respective student cohort, in models 1 and 3, we do find a significant effect of
these regressors, but it has an unanticipated sign, suggesting that alternative career options
make rather than break the case for academia: If the judiciary is large at the moment when a
young lawyer decides about her career, she ismore likely to become a professor. Likewise, the
larger the gross national product is at this point in time, themore she is likely to forego the
earning opportunities in the law firms, and to start an academic career instead. The effect of
the total number of judges disappears once we control for the size of the student cohort (model
2). The effect of GNP goes down to about a third of its previous size, but remains significant
(models 4). The effect of the number of judges in model 1 partly picks up the effect of student
cohorts, suggesting a correlation about the causes of which we could only speculate. The higher
the GNP is, the more habilitations occur eight years later, as shown in model 3. The remaining
Fig 9. GNP Development as a Proxy for earning Prospects in Law Firms.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159815.g009
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effect of GNP in model 4 could reflect the expectation of future law professors that a more
prosperous country will continue the expansion of the university system.
Available Positions in Academia
When professors offer a promising student a post-doc position, and when this student decides
to accept the position and to prepare for an academic career, it would be rational for both to
consider the number of positions that will be available when the candidate is on the market,
i.e., some eight years from then. If this number is constant, this is of course not a concern. But
the two shocks that drive the peaks in Fig 2 result from the rapid expansion of public universi-
ties. In the 1970s, policy makers wanted to educate a much larger fraction of the population. In
the 1990s, reunification led to a high demand for new professors. In response to both shocks,
individuals from some birth cohorts were much more likely to become professors than aca-
demics who were a few years older or younger. In German public universities, the mandatory
retirement age is, once again, 68 (with a sustained interlude where retirement age has been low-
ered to 65). Due to this, the demand for law professors predictably peaks when one of the
cohorts hired during one of the two shocks is up for retirement.
Data about open positions is only available from 1992 on. Since we need an eight-year lag,
this would reduce our time series to only nine years. We therefore work with the share of pro-
fessors aged 60 and above. This data has been reported by the German Federal Bureau of Statis-
tics since 1966 (series 11 schedule S.1 prior to 1990 and schedule 4.4 subsequently), although
initially only for selected years. Descriptively it seems as if this information might have had
some influence after the first peak. By contrast, the second peak seems to have been unaffected
(Fig 10).
Yet model 2 of Table 4 suggests that the number of habilitations is not driven by the antici-
pated development of open positions eight years ahead. The regressor is insignificant. Adding
this control variable explains less than an additional percent of the variance, in a model that
already explains 88% (model 1). The coefficients of the remaining control variables change
very little. Most importantly, the eight-year lag of the dependent variable becomes even more
pronounced. We can therefore exclude that the hog cycle is spurious. The impression of a cycle
Table 3. Adding Measures for Alternative Career Options.
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4
time trend -1.820* -2.469*** -6.361*** -5.029***
# judges 9.026** -1.901
GNP 447.808*** 162.010*
student cohort lag20 1.767*** 1.520***
lag8 habil -.258+ -.358*** -.557** -.404***
cons -41.831+ 86.836*** -31.221* 40.544**
N 42 42 42 42
p model < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001
R2 .3645 .7782 .3997 .7944
depvar: # habilitations in year x, robust standard errors; time trend is 0 in 1960, and grows by 1 every year; student cohort is # of newly inscribed students in
all German universities, 20 years ago; # judges eight years ago; GNP eight years ago, in % of GNP 2009
*** p < .001,
** p < .01,
* p < .05,
+ p < .1
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159815.t003
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Fig 10. Expected Number of Available Positions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159815.g010
Table 4. Adding a Proxy for Available Positions in Academia.
model 1 model 2 model 3
time trend -4.369*** -4.615*** -4.651***
student cohort lag 20 2.190*** 2.195*** 2.076***
fraction professors above 60 lag 8 82.481
absolute number professor above 60 lag 8 .016
lag8 habil -.370** -.462** -.655*
cons 98.164*** 101.176*** 117.940***
N 28 28 28
p model < .001 < .001 < .001
R2 .8810 .8881 .8913
depvar: # habilitations in year x, robust standard errors; time trend is 0 in 1960, and grows by 1 every year; student cohort is # of newly inscribed students in
all German universities, 20 years ago; model 1 repeats model 1 of Table 2, but cuts the time series to the 28 data points for which we have the additional
control variable that we use in model 2; fraction/number of professors 8 years ago: missing data replaced by linear imputation, using last reported value +
((next reported value–last reported value)/(number of missing values))*(position in this series of missing values)
*** p < .001,
** p < .01,
* p < .05,
+ p < .1
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159815.t004
The Hog Cycle of Law Professors
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0159815 July 28, 2016 15 / 22
does not result from the fact that those considering preparing for the academic market do
something very sensible, namely react to predicted volatility of demand.
The decision to embark on an academic career might also be influenced by the absolute
number of professors close to retirement, rather than their share. This would imply that the
future professors are less sensitive to the overall turnaround, and would rather care about how
many opportunities they expect to exist for applying. Model 3 of Table 4 demonstrates that this
information does not have a significant effect either. In this specification, the eight-year lag of
the dependent variable becomes even more pronounced.
Model Selection
The previous analysis indicates that a model controlling for the time trend and the student
cohort twenty years ago, plus an autocorrelation term with a lag of eight years, best explains
our data. This fully supports our hypothesis. Since the lag is highly significant and substantially
negative in this model, this suggests that there is indeed a hog cycle, triggered by perceived job
opportunities at the moment when the future professor and her supervisor decide to have her
prepare for entering the market. We now undertake a number of robustness checks to corrobo-
rate our result.
As we have discussed near the end of Section 2 and illustrated in Fig 2, our dependent vari-
able reacted positively to two strong exogenous shocks in the early 1970s and 2000s. If our
hypothesis holds true, promising young lawyers should not only be influenced in their decision
to prepare for an academic career if they observe such salient shocks. As a first robustness
check, we thus control for the effect these two shocks have had per se (apart from their ability
to trigger a cycle). Model 3 below enriches our model with dummy variables that neutralise the
two peaks exhibited by our data in Fig 2. (Note that the second peak stretches over more than
one year. Our dummy flags the first year in which the number of habilitations was close to
maximum, but results do not change for any other year during that peak.) These additional
control variables are indeed significant, but they do not affect our variable of interest, the eight-
year lag.
As another check of robustness, we examine a partial autocorrelation plot. Since we already
know that there is a time trend and that we must control for the size of student cohorts, we do
not base this plot on the raw data, but on the residuals from a regression that controls for these
two variables (but of course not for the eight-year lag). Partial correlations measure the correla-
tion of the number of habilitations in any given year with the number of habilitations n years
ago, after the effect of all shorter lags has been partialled out. As one sees, the negative correla-
tion with the number of habilitations eight years ago indeed stands out (see Fig 11). This
demonstrates that we are justified in using the eight-year lag, rather than lags of alternative
duration.
Fig 11 suggests that, additionally, there is positive autocorrelation with the year before. This
is plausible. Habilitation procedure is complicated. Candidates starting in the same year may
not all be able to finish their habilitation thesis at the same moment, and some law schools are
better than others at organizing the formal procedure. As a first robustness check, we therefore
estimate a model with an additional autocorrelation term for the one-year lag (Table 5, model
2). The additional lag is indeed significant, but adding this additional control variable does not
affect the significance or the size of the negative eight-year lag.
In our preferred model, we use the time trend for detrending the data, since this gives coeffi-
cients a straightforward interpretation. In the time series literature, detrending is typically
done through first differencing. If we use this procedure, we again support the significant nega-
tive eight-year lag, model 4.
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Fig 11. Partial Autocorrelation of Residuals. From OLS of # of habilitations in year t, controlling for # of new
students in t-20 and the time trend.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159815.g011
Table 5. Alternative Specifications of Preferred Model.
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 model 5 model 6
depvar # habil # habil # habil # habil # habil # habil
time trend -2.772*** -1.740* -1.252** -2.434*** -3.044***
student cohort 1.659*** 1.066** .829** .194** 1.468*** 1.744***
lag1habil .352* .421** -.346***
lag8habil -.335*** -.303** -.244** -.238** -.594***
year1970 27.089*** 32.770*** 21.249* 17.420*
year1998 7.783** 7.715** 1.391 7.082
ma(1) .380
lag8habil, instrumented by lag10habil -.293**
cons 68.087*** 46.003** 35.648*** 14.993** 53.790*** 71.142***
N 42 42 42 42 42 40
p model < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001
R2 .7738 .8095 .8636 .5459 .8479
depvar: # habilitations in year x, robust standard errors; time trend is 0 in 1960, and grows by 1 every year; student cohort is # of newly inscribed students in
all German universities, 20 years ago; year1970 is an indicator variable that is 1 for habilitations in 1970; year1998 is an indicator variable that is 1 for
habilitations in 1998; ma(1) is a moving average term, of length 1 year
*** p < .001,
** p < .01,
* p < .05
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159815.t005
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A model with an autocorrelation term assumes that the effect of a past shock only gradually
fades away. Our explanation for the significance of the one-year lag would also fit a model with
a moving average term, which is assumed to become immaterial after the period affected is
over. Model 5 shows that the moving average term is indeed positive and significant but that,
in this model, the p-value for the eight-year lag is even smaller. Since we want to jointly esti-
mate a moving average term and an autocorrelation term, in this model we represent the auto-
correlation by the lag in residuals, not in the dependent variable (i.e., we use Stata command
arima), and find that deeper moving average terms are insignificant.
Finally, in model 6 we instrument the eight-year lag by the ten-year lag that our earlier
results show to be clearly uncorrelated with the dependent variable, i.e., with the number of
habilitations today (after controlling for the time trend and the size of the relevant student
cohort). This way we guard against the possibility that omitted variables make our estimation
of the eight-year lag inconsistent. Although in this model we only have the correlation between
our instrument and the eight-year lag for explanation, the effect of the eight-year lag still is
highly significant–and remains significant if we add the 11-year lag as an additional instru-
ment. Note that this procedure is in the spirit of the Arellano Bond model. The Arellano Bond
model is concerned with possible inconsistency resulting from patterned heterogeneity
between individuals (cross sections) in a panel. Heterogeneity can be interpreted as an omitted
variable. Instrumenting with lags of the dependent variable one has reason to believe to be
uncorrelated with contemporaneous choices removes the resulting risk of inconsistency. We
do not have a panel, so that inconsistency cannot result from unobserved heterogeneity. But
past lags as internal instruments are also valid in a mere time series model. Yet, since we need
not remove individual specific effects, we have no reason to first first-difference the data.
Summing these additional tests up, we find that our main result, the eight-year lag, is very
robust to changes in the specification of the statistical model. Note that all robustness checks
leave the significant eight-year lag of the independent variable unaffected, even if we perform
them on model 2 of Table 4. To avoid working with this considerably shorter time series (and
partly imputed data for the percentage of professors above 60) we have presented robustness
checks only on the model without this additional control variable, but the alternative robust-
ness checks are available from the authors upon request.
Conclusions
Currently the entry-level job market in legal academia “remains largely a black box” for which
“we do not know the factors that influence how law schools and candidates make decisions”
[1]:5. To contemplate some such factors and to lift the lid on the black box of these job market
decisions, we have shown that the market for law professors fulfils the conditions for a cobweb,
namely inelasticity of supply and demand as well as perishability: Preparation for an academic
career in law takes many years. Therefore supply cannot swiftly adapt to changes in demand.
The (German) law faculties are hesitant to hire candidates who have been on the market for
more than a small number of years. The faculties tend to read this as a signal that something
must be wrong with this candidate. Therefore future law professors are a perishable commod-
ity. Finally, the (German) law faculties live off public funds and must pay salaries that are fixed
by statute. The faculties are therefore unable to respond to excess supply by hiring more profes-
sors. Theory thus predicts a hog cycle: When there have been too few law professors in the
past, there is too much supply today. When there have been too many law professors in the
past, there is too little supply today.
In this paper, we exploit the fact that, in the German university system, future law professors
must formally qualify for the academic market by passing habilitation. The decision to grant
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habilitation is taken by the law school of origin, which is prevented from hiring its own candi-
dates. We are thus in a position to quantify precisely the supply of candidates for all the years
since 1960. We find significant autocorrelation, but time lags alone explain little of the variance
in our data. This changes if we control for the overall time trend and for the size of student
cohorts. Fig 12 summarizes our results. A mere time series model (left panel) has a relatively
poor fit, despite the fact that the lag of 15 years is highly significant. By contrast, the model con-
trolling for the overall time trend and the size of student cohorts, with autocorrelation of eight
years (right panel), has an excellent visual fit.
In our final model (see Table 5, model 1), we find significant negative correlation between
the number of habilitations eight years ago and today. The correlation coefficient is -.335, i.e.,
three more habilitations eight years ago approximately deter one habilitation today, and three
fewer habilitations eight years ago encourage one more habilitation today. This suggests that,
when a supervisor approaches a promising candidate, and when this candidate accepts the
offered post-doc position, both are overly sensitive to current experiences on the academic
market. If law schools currently have a hard time filling open positions, and if those who have
just passed habilitation quickly find a good job, supervisors and candidates infer that there is
demand for more law professors. By contrast, if one open position currently draws 50 or 60
applications, out of which many are serious candidates, supervisors are hesitant to invite prom-
ising young lawyers to embark on such a hazardous career, or candidates turn down offers for
that reason.
Fig 12 also serves another purpose. We can use either model to make out-of-sample predic-
tions for 10 years after the end of our time-series. Given our findings, one should not trust pre-
dictions from the mere time series, but should also take student cohorts into account, and
should control for the time trend. Student cohorts of those researchers applying for open posi-
tions at the law faculties between 2010 and 2020 are already known. Using this information,
our model predicts another steep increase until 2018, with some 85 candidates.
Shall we use this information to repeat the advice Fritz Baade and Hermann Abeking gave
hog farmers in the 30s of the previous century [8]? They urged them to adopt an anti-cyclical
Fig 12. Out-of-sample Predictions. (A) Left panel is based on the best-performing model of Fig 4, i.e., on mere autocorrelation with a 15-year lag. (B) Right
panel is based on final model, i.e., on model 1 of Table 5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0159815.g012
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investment policy. In our case, this would mean that promising young lawyers should be hesi-
tant to embark on an academic career (and supervisors should hesitate to encourage them)
when present job opportunities are plentiful. If our regression has it right, when these lawyers
are ready for the market of professors, good candidates will be in excess supply. There are two
reasons why such conclusions ought to be treated with more caution, though. It is not clear
how fast and how profoundly the demand side of this market is changing. Finance ministers
may be forced, after the financial crisis, to cut back on all public expenses, university education
included. Law faculties may be forced to react to severe cuts by structural reforms. Such
reforms are likely to privilege cheaper new candidates over the promotion of more established
professors.
Moreover, an anti-cyclical reaction is only individually beneficial if most others behave
cyclically. Theoretically, the resulting problem is well understood. It is known in game theory
as the beauty contest, following John Maynard Keynes’ famous likening of the stock market “to
those newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces
from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most
nearly corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole” [32]. Keynes
anticipated what later got generalized as the theory of level-k-reasoning [33, 34]. It considers
self-referential decision processes, where decision outcomes depend on the expected decisions
of others in the same situation, and assumes that players determine best replies to each other’s
behaviour by reasoning iteratively. For instance, let a simpleton with no regard for fellow play-
ers’ strategies be defined as a level 0 player, then any player who anticipates and reacts to level-
0-reasoning would inhabit level 1. Even more sophisticated strategists would ascend to level 2
by anticipating level-1-reasoning, and so on. In its general form, any level-k-strategy assumes
that all other players use reasoning levels between 0 and (k-1). Empirical research suggests that
most people only use a degenerate version of this iterated best reply mechanism, with level-1
and level-2 being most prominent (for a comprehensive survey, see [35]).
While this literature suggests that the foresight of most people is rather limited, is it plausi-
ble to assume that the large majority of future law professors, and of their supervisors, is not
clear-sighted at all? Probably not, as the studies mentioned above even found a remarkable pro-
portion of people adopting level-1-reasoning, depending on their respective training, time
availability, effort, and judgment confidence. On the other hand, for future law professors the
problem is exacerbated by the fact that they must predict a market some eight years ahead.
Therefore the strategic uncertainty inherent in the beauty contest is compounded by the sto-
chastic uncertainty inherent in all sorts of changes that may happen in the meantime.
In principle, government could step in and limit the number of positions available for future
candidates for habilitation. This number could correspond to the expected number of open
positions eight years ahead. Yet for a number of reasons, this solution would be problematic. In
many domains, government forecasts of future developments have widely gone wrong. If the
number of positions available for habilitation is determined by law, there will be strong pres-
sure for candidates indeed to be hired once they have passed habilitation. This would cut into
the budget autonomy of the legislator. Most importantly, this solution would profoundly
change universities. One would need a nationwide competition for the positions that are made
available. Effectively, the decision who is going to be a professor would be taken after this indi-
vidual has acquired her doctorate, not after habilitation. Essentially, Germany would have to
shift to the tenure-track system. There is debate whether this system is preferable. But breaking
the hog cycle of candidates is certainly not a sufficient reason for making this move.
We must therefore leave young lawyers considering an academic career with a problem of
judgement: If they want to rely on our findings, they must also estimate how many of their
potential competitors will try to second-guess the market at the moment when they expect to
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enter it. Ultimately, the traditional piece of advice will remain best: Only prepare for an aca-
demic career in law if your advisor truly believes in you, and if you prefer a life driven by aca-
demic curiosity over the alternative options for a good lawyer.
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